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According to Agrippa’s trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads 
to either infi nite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. This essay examines 
whether and to what extent the trilemma applies to ethics. There are 
various responses to the trilemma, such as foundationalism, coherent-
ism, contextualism, infi nitism, and German idealism. Examining those 
responses, the essay shows that the trilemma applies at least to rational 
justifi cation of contentful moral beliefs. This means that rationalist eth-
ics based on any contentful moral belief are rationally unjustifi able.
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1. Introduction
According to Agrippa’s trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads 
to either infi nite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. This essay exam-
ines whether and to what extent the trilemma applies to ethics. There 
are various responses to the trilemma, such as foundationalism, coher-
entism, contextualism, infi nitism, and German idealism. Examining 
those responses, I show that the trilemma applies at least to ratio-
nal justifi cation of contentful moral beliefs.1 Finally, I point out that 
rationalist ethics based on any contentful moral belief are rationally 
unjustifi able.
1 Contentful moral beliefs are moral beliefs which have content. In contrast, 
empty moral beliefs are moral beliefs which have no content. For example, the belief 
“it is always moral to act morally” is an empty moral belief.
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2. Agrippa’s Trilemma
According to Agrippa’s trilemma (also called the Münchhausen trilem-
ma), an attempt to justify something leads to one of the following three 
alternatives: (1) infi nite regress—tracing grounds endlessly, which is 
practically impossible; (2) circularity—repeating a ground given earlier, 
which is logically unconvincing; or (3) dogmatism—abandoning the at-
tempt and accepting a ground at some point, which is arbitrary.2 In the 
following sections, I will examine various responses to the trilemma, 
and show that it applies at least to rational justifi cation of morality.
3. Foundationalism
According to Michael Williams, foundational theories of knowledge and 
justifi cation “identify beliefs that are justifi ably held without requiring 
further back-up.” He calls those beliefs “basic beliefs.”3 As basic beliefs, 
let us examine Apel’s transcendental pragmatics of language, math-
ematics, logic, the Erlangen School, and immediate experience.
3.1 Apel’s Transcendental Pragmatics of Language
Apel transforms Kant’s transcendental philosophy, shifting the focus 
from consciousness to language. Kant holds that acquiring knowledge 
is an individual matter. Yet according to Apel, “the evidence for con-
sciousness in Descartes’, Kant’s and even Husserl’s sense is insuffi cient 
to ground the validity of knowledge.” For valid knowledge, it is neces-
sary to elevate “personal evidence for consciousness to a paradigm of 
the language-game.”4 Since the language-game takes place only within 
a communication community, Apel thinks that this community is the 
condition of the possibility of valid knowledge. Since the pragmatic 
dimension (sign interpretation) of language is crucial for the validity 
of knowledge, Apel calls his position “transcendental pragmatics of 
language.”5
Apel holds that anyone who argues seriously is simultaneously a 
member of a “real community of communication” and of a counterfac-
tual “unlimited, ideal community of communication.” Apel writes,
2 The trilemma originates from the Five Modes of Agrippa in ancient Pyrrhonian 
skepticism. See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, ed. Julia Annas and 
Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), bk. 1, secs. 
164–77; Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 
vols., vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), bk. 9, secs. 88–89. 
Hans Albert calls the trilemma the Münchhausen trilemma. Hans Albert, Treatise 
on Critical Reason, trans. Mary Varney Rorty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), 18.
3 Michael Williams, Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Episte-
mology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 67.
4 Karl-Otto Apel, Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. Glyn Adey and 
David Fisby (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1998), 137.
5 Ibid., 265.
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First, in serious argumentation, indeed, already in posing the question, we 
have in principle acknowledged both the solidary responsibility for solving 
problems and the equality of rights in problem-solving shared by all members 
of a real community of communication—a community that consists precisely 
of humanity as it presently exists. Second, however, with the necessary, con-
trafactual anticipation of an unlimited, ideal community of communication, 
we have also recognized in principle that all valid solutions to problems—
including especially the ethically relevant solutions—would have to be ca-
pable of being assented to by all members of the unlimited, ideal community 
of communication, if they were able to take part in the discussion.6
While the “real community of communication” consists of “persons who 
are alive today and capable of discourse,” the “unlimited community of 
communication” consists of “persons who it may be presumed will exist 
someday.”7 Human knowledge is fallible, so that agreement within the 
real communication community is also fallible. Apel thinks that the 
unlimited ideal community is a solution to the human fallibility.
Apel tries to provide ultimate foundations non-deductively. He says, 
“If ‘grounding’ is the same as derivation of something from something 
else, i.e. in a strict sense: deduction, then no ultimate foundation is 
possible.”8 Instead, an ultimate foundation is possible “by transcenden-
tal-refl ection on those presuppositions of actual thought [argumenta-
tion] that cannot be denied without committing a performative self-
contradiction.”9 A performative self-contradiction is a contradiction 
between what one says and what his saying it implies or intends. Argu-
ing against the presuppositions of argumentation already accepts the 
presuppositions, and therefore is self-contradictory. Apel says, “If, on 
the one hand, a presupposition cannot be challenged in argumenta-
tion without actual performative self-contradiction, and if, on the other 
hand, it cannot be deductively grounded without formal-logical petitio 
principii, then it belongs to those transcendental-pragmatic presuppo-
sitions of argumentation that one must always (already) have accept-
ed, if the language game of argumentation is to be meaningful.”10 Apel 
holds that those presuppositions are ultimate foundations.11
6 Karl-Otto Apel, “Macroethics, Responsibility for the Future, and the Crisis 
of Technological Society: Refl ections on Hans Jonas,” in Karl-Otto Apel: Selected 
Essays, vol. 2, Ethics and the Theory of Rationality, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996), 235.
7 Ibid., 236.
8 Karl-Otto Apel, The Response of Discourse Ethics to the Moral Challenge of the 
Human Situation as Such and Especially Today (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2001), 41.
9 Ibid., 45.
10 Karl-Otto Apel, “The Problem of Philosophical Foundations in Light of a Trans-
cendental Pragmatics of Language,” in After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, 
ed. Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1987), 277.
11 While Apel does not specify those ultimate foundations in detail, Robert Alexy 
specifi es the rules and forms of practical discourse in detail. See Robert Alexy, “A 
Theory of Practical Discourse,” in The Communicative Ethics Controversy, ed. Seyla 
Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 163–76. However, 
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Similarly to Apel, Jürgen Habermas thinks that the trilemma does 
not apply to everything. He claims that the trilemma applies only to 
deductive logic on a semantic level.
[The trilemma] arises only if one presupposes a semantic concept of justifi -
cation that is oriented to a deductive relationship between statements and 
based solely on the concept of logical inference. This deductive concept of 
justifi cation is obviously too narrow for the exposition of the pragmatic rela-
tions between argumentative speech acts. Principles of induction and uni-
versalization are introduced as rules of argumentation for the sole purpose 
of bridging the logical gap in nondeductive relations. Accordingly, these 
bridging principles are not susceptible to deductive justifi cation, which is 
the only form of justifi cation allowed by the Münchhausen trilemma.12
Habermas is wrong in this claim. Albert points out that the trilemma 
applies not only to deductive logic, but also to other inferential proce-
dures such as induction and transcendental deduction.
[T]he situation is not essentially altered if inferential processes other than 
those of deductive logic are introduced in order to bring about the foundation 
regress. Neither the use of inductive procedures of any kind nor recourse to 
some transcendental deduction can help to remedy the situation; nor is it 
basically altered if one shifts the problem from the horizontal plane—that 
is, from the analysis of contexts of statements on the same linguistic level—
to the vertical, on which one seeks adequate justifi cation of one’s criteria 
for workable inferential procedures and for ultimate linguistic or extralin-
guistic authorities which may be used as a basis for inference. Here, too, the 
trilemma must necessarily arise.13
Let us examine Apel’s response to the trilemma. Gerard Radnitz-
ky refutes Apel’s attempt to provide ultimate foundations. Radnitzky 
summarizes and criticizes Apel’s argument as follows:
(1) If you wish to argue, you must accept the Criticist Frame (argumenta-
tive dialogue); (2) you have entered a dialogue—conclusion: you have implic-
itly (by your action) accepted the Criticist Frame.
If (1) is construed as a defi nition of ‘arguing’ (or of ‘dialogue’), it is empty. 
If it is construed as a synthetic sentence, it is fallible. (2) is a synthetic sen-
tence, hence fallible. Apel’s attempt to produce an “ultimate justifi er” has 
failed.14
not all of them can serve as an ultimate foundation. It is possible to criticize and 
reject some of them without committing a performative self-contradiction. Like Apel, 
Habermas thinks that the transcendental-pragmatic justifi cation is possible. But 
unlike Apel, he holds that it “cannot have the status of an ultimate justifi cation and…
there is no need to claim this status for it.” Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness 
and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 82.
12 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 79.
13 Albert, Treatise on Critical Reason, 20–21.
14 Gerard Radnitzky, “Reply to Hoppe—on apriorism in Austrian Economics,” 
in Values and the Social Order, vol. 1, Values and society, ed. Gerard Radnitzky 
and Hardy Bouillon (Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1995), 191–92. See also Hans 
Albert, Transzendentale Träumereien: Karl-Otto Apels Sprachspiele und sein 
hermeneutischer Gott (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1975); Gerard Radnitzky, 
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Radnitzky claims that since any attempt to justify synthetic state-
ments leads to the trilemma, Apel’s ultimate justifi cation is subject to 
the trilemma.
Radnitzky also says as follows: “neither truth claims with respect to 
a descriptive statement nor validity claims with respect to a norm can 
be justifi ed by action. Even if everybody were engaged in argumenta-
tive dialogue all the time, the Criticist Frame would still not be justifi ed 
by this fact.” “Although it is an inconsistent position if verbalized by 
arguments, it is psychologically possible to revolt against the Criticist 
Frame, to reject it.” One can do this, for example, “by ‘metaphysical sui-
cide’ (from Kierkegaard to Camus), or in psychosis or pseudo-psychosis 
(as Pirandello’s Enrico IV), and perhaps he can stop the inner dialogue 
(as it is attempted in some yoga exercises).”15 There is no need to adopt 
the Criticist Frame.
Although Radnitzky is right in a strictly philosophical sense, it is in-
appropriate in an ethical sense. In ethics, we take for granted certain 
matters, such as the existence of self, others, and some other non-moral 
facts. If we reject those assumptions, ethics does not make sense in the 
fi rst place. Therefore, taking his claim in full is inappropriate in ethics. I 
admit that we accept the Criticist Frame when we argue. I do not ques-
tion this fact.
The same applies to extreme skepticism about morality. Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong presents an extremely skeptical scenario where a 
demon deceives us into believing in morality when nothing is moral 
or immoral. As Sinnott-Armstrong says, strictly speaking, we cannot 
rule out this possibility.16 He holds that “justifi cation is relative to a 
contrast class,”17 a set of alternative possibilities to a belief. In his view, 
a belief is justifi ed only when one is able to rule out all the alternative 
possibilities in the contrast class. But it is inappropriate to include the 
extremely skeptical scenario in a morally relevant contrast class. Re-
gardless of whether Sinnott-Armstrong’s view of justifi cation is right, 
taking the extremely skeptical scenario is inappropriate in ethics.
In any case, the Criticist Frame cannot provide ultimate foundations 
of morality. First, the Criticist Frame belongs to non-moral normative 
beliefs. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that non-moral normative beliefs can-
not justify moral beliefs without a substantive moral bridge principle.18 
For example, the Criticist Frame cannot justify moral beliefs without a 
bridge principle like the following: moral norms are the ones reached by 
“In Defense of Self-Applicable Critical Rationalism,” in Evolutionary Epistemology, 
Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Gerard Radnitzky and W. W. Bartley 
(La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987), 296–301.
15 Radnitzky, “In Defense of Self-Applicable Critical Rationalism,” 301.
16 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Moral Skepticism and Justifi cation,” in Moral 
Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 
and Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 15.
17 Ibid., 20.
18 Ibid., 10–12.
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the Criticist Frame. The bridge principle is a substantive moral belief 
and subject to Agrippa’s trilemma. The Criticist Frame itself is just a 
tool and has no moral implications. It can be used for planning, doing, 
or justifying not only moral actions but amoral actions and so-called im-
moral actions, such as fraud, extortion, murder, and so on. Therefore, 
one cannot draw morality from the Criticist Frame alone. Second, there 
is no guarantee that the Criticist Frame will remain the same in the 
future. As a language changes, the Criticist Frame might also change.
3.2 Mathematics and Logic
Mathematics is a priori knowledge. Williams identifi es it as basic beliefs. 
But he says, “Not even elementary mathematical judgments seem to be 
credible all by themselves: to grasp them at all, it seems, we need some 
understanding of a whole system of arithmetic.”19 In any case, mathe-
matical principles themselves have no moral implications. They are just 
a tool. They can be used for planning, doing, or justifying not only moral 
actions but immoral actions and amoral actions. Therefore, it is impos-
sible to draw morality from mathematical principles themselves.
Logic is also a priori knowledge. Yet logic is not free from criticism. 
William Warren Bartley, an advocate of pancritical rationalism, identifi es 
paradoxes internal to logic, which can be grounds for distrusting logic.
[T]here are the logical paradoxes (the liar, Richard, Grelling, etc.). The par-
adoxes are reached in the course of rigorously logical argument. Therein lies 
their telling power: using logic, and presupposing logic, one reaches illogic. 
If the paradoxes could not be avoided, then one would have grounds for 
deeply distrusting logic and rational argumentation. Of course one might 
say that in rejecting logic because it led to illogic, one is presupposing logic 
and is hence inconsistent. But the irrationalist makes no claim to be consis-
tent. And would it be more consistent to accept logic that led to illogic?
Apart from the paradoxes internal to logic, there are other grounds for 
distrusting logic. Bartley writes,
(1) Relativism, fi deism, and scepticism contend, on the basis of arguments 
about the limits of rationality widely thought to be rational, logical, and 
indestructible, that serious argumentation is futile in the sense that, from a 
rational or logical viewpoint, one position is as good as another. Their basic 
contention is that there is a rational excuse for irrationalism.
(2) The upshot of determinism—another position reached by many on 
the basis of reason and logic—is that all argument is illusory.…If one’s views 
are fully determined by natural laws and boundary conditions, then they do 
not depend on the force of argument or on the weighing of evidence.…If de-
terminism is true, then the distinction between being forced to reject logic 
and being argued out of logic loses its meaning.20
19 Michael Williams, “Skepticism,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed. 
John Greco and Ernest Sosa (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1999), 42.
20 William Warren Bartley, The Retreat to Commitment, 2nd ed. (La Salle, IL: 
Open Court, 1984), 259.
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Thus, Bartley claims that such people as irrationalists, relativists, fi -
deists, skeptics, and determinists have grounds for distrusting logic. 
Since “the irrationalist makes no claim to be consistent,” self-contradic-
tion does not matter to him. Bartley also distinguishes use of argument 
from belief in it. The irrationalist can use argument, “not because he 
himself takes argument seriously, but because he knows that the ra-
tionalist does. The irrationalist uses argument because he knows that 
argument is effective against rationalists.” Bartley says, “The irratio-
nalist may, of course, also take argument seriously—and may even 
do so consistently—in any area which, in his opinion, does not run up 
against the alleged limits of reason. The irrationalist, with no need to 
be consistent, may invoke reason frequently or not at all.”21 Unlike the 
rationalist, who both believes in and uses argument, the irrationalist 
partly believes in or does not believe in argument and uses or does not 
use it. The irrationalist has more freedom than the rationalist.
On one hand, one cannot refute some logical principles without a 
performative self-contradiction. On the other hand, one cannot strictly 
justify some logical principles because the justifi cation needs to use 
those principles, which leads to circularity. Some might try to appeal 
to something other than logic (for example, God) to justify logic, but 
this also needs to use some logic to draw a conclusion (for example, 
God is such and such, therefore…). Any attempt to justify some logical 
principles leads to circularity. Therefore, some logical principles belong 
to what Apel calls transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions of argu-
mentation. I regard those principles as basic beliefs.
Agrippa’s trilemma is a logical principle and basic belief. The trilem-
ma suggests that justifi cation is impossible. Yet Williams says, “isn’t it 
obviously self-defeating to argue that nothing can ever be justifi ed?”22 
According to Albert, the trilemma arises “if one demands a justifi ca-
tion for everything.”23 But the “everything” includes the trilemma itself. 
Therefore, if one demands justifi cation for the trilemma, it leads to the 
trilemma. Victor Kraft claims that, by showing the trilemma through 
logical reasoning, Albert himself establishes his thesis of the impossi-
bility of justifi cation.24 In other words, by the trilemma, Albert justifi es 
the knowledge that it is impossible to justify knowledge. Considering 
the paradox, the scope to which the trilemma applies does not include 
the trilemma itself. The scope also does not include what the trilemma 
presupposes (such as some logical principles and some linguistic rules) 
and what logically follows from it. Applying the trilemma to them is 
self-refuting.
21 Ibid., 260n25.
22 Williams, Problems of Knowledge, 66.
23 Albert, Treatise on Critical Reason, 18.
24 Viktor Kraft, Die Grundformen der wissenschaftlichen Methoden, 2nd ed. 
(Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973), 12. 
Many philosophers criticize Albert. For Albert’s responses, see Hans Albert, Traktat 
über kritische Vernunft, 5th ed. (Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr, 1991), Anhang.
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In any case, logic itself cannot provide an ultimate foundation of 
morality. Logic itself is just a tool and has no moral implications. It can 
be used for planning, doing, or justifying not only moral actions but im-
moral actions and amoral actions. Therefore, one cannot draw morality 
from logic itself.
3.3 The Erlangen School
According to Radnitzky, the Erlangen School “proposes actions as the 
ultimate stopping point.” He explains it by the following example: “As-
sume that A claims that he can stand on his head and then performs 
this feat. In this event, it is said, A has justifi ed the truth claim that he 
implicitly made by uttering the statement. Thus what is claimed is that 
A has—by his action—proved the truth of his assertion. (If he asserted 
that he is unable to X, it would be claimed that his act of performing X 
falsifi es his assertion.)” Radnitzky remarks, “Such an attempt to justify 
an ultimate stopping point is, however, epistemologically naive. That 
we, having witnessed the performance, are convinced is irrelevant to 
the epistemological issue.” He says, “our experience does not provide 
any infallible method for ascertaining the truth-value of this particular 
statement, or any truth guarantee.”25
From a strictly philosophical standpoint, Radnitzky is right because 
any attempt to justify our experience (such as the existence of an action) 
leads to the trilemma. Yet, as said before, since ethics takes for granted 
the existence of some non-moral facts, taking Radnitzky’s claim in full 
is inappropriate in ethics.
In any case, an action itself cannot provide an ultimate foundation 
of morality. Since there are not only moral actions but immoral actions 
and amoral actions, an action itself has no moral implications. There-
fore, one cannot draw morality from an action itself.
Radnitzky also writes,
The “Erlangen School” operates consistently with a consensus theory of truth. 
It offers a “defi nition” of “truth” which runs as follows: A statement is true if 
and only if it is such that in an ideal discourse situation (“symmetrical”, with 
all partners having good intentions and being well-informed) all would in the 
long run assent to it. But, this does not provide a defi nition of the concept of 
truth; it merely indicates a particular method for ascertaining truth-value—
incidentally, a method which cannot be used in any concrete case. Moreover, 
it would not matter in this counter-factual “method” for the predication of 
‘truth’ whether or not the statement under consideration is true or not.26
The consensus theory of truth is problematic because agreement has 
nothing to do with truth and moral rightness. I discuss this issue else-
where.27
25 Radnitzky, “In Defense of Self-Applicable Critical Rationalism,” 299.
26 Ibid.
27 See Noriaki Iwasa, “Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws,” Journal of 
Value Inquiry 47, nos. 1–2 (2013).
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3.4 Immediate Experience
As basic beliefs, Williams mentions immediate experience like pain. 
He says, “If you are in pain, you just know it. The question ‘How do you 
know?’ has no clear application here.”28 As immediate experience, let us 
think about sense experience in general. John Pollock writes,
The person would be justifi ed in believing that all of his senses mislead him 
in a systematic way. Notice that this is not simply a matter of his reject-
ing all of the evidence of his senses and adopting a skeptical stance. He 
has positive beliefs concerning precisely how his senses mislead him. But I 
submit that it is impossible for him to be justifi ed in holding such a set of be-
liefs. A person may well be justifi ed in believing that some particular sense 
misleads him in some systematic way. For example, a color-blind person can 
know that he is color-blind. But he can know that only by relying upon other 
evidence of his senses. It is impossible for a person to be justifi ed in believ-
ing that all of his senses systematically mislead him all of the time.…All 
justifi cation must eventually terminate with some epistemologically basic 
beliefs that do not require independent justifi cation. And at least some of 
these beliefs must have something to do with the evidence of our senses.29
If our senses supplied only false information, we could not fi nd this out 
in the fi rst place, because a sense which supplies correct information 
is necessary to fi nd it out. Even if our senses are sometimes illusory 
or misleading, we cannot distrust them all. It would be reasonable to 
regard immediate experience as basic beliefs.
Then does immediate experience provide rational justifi cation of 
morality? Williams says, “As for immediate experience, it cannot be 
the sensations themselves that constitute the foundations of knowl-
edge. Lacking propositional content, sensations cannot stand in logi-
cal relations to beliefs and so can neither support nor falsify beliefs.”30 
But some immediate experience can support or falsify some non-moral 
beliefs. For example, some immediate experience can support beliefs 
in the existence of self, others, and some other non-moral facts. Those 
beliefs themselves have no moral implications. They can be used for 
planning, doing, or justifying not only moral actions but immoral ac-
tions and amoral actions. Therefore, they cannot justify morality. On 
the other hand, some immediate experience may support moral beliefs. 
According to moral sense theory, moral judgments rest on inner sensa-
tions. If moral sense theory is right, some inner sensations justify mor-
al beliefs. In other words, some immediate experience is the ground for 
moral beliefs. However, this ground is not rational. Moral sense theory 
provides non-rational justifi cation of morality. In any case, immediate 
experience does not disprove that the trilemma applies to rational jus-
tifi cation of morality.
28 Williams, “Skepticism,” 41.
29 John L. Pollock, “Perceptual Knowledge,” Philosophical Review 80, no. 3 
(1971): 291–92.
30 Williams, “Skepticism,” 42.
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3.5 There Is No Rational Ground for Morality
I have discussed various basic beliefs. From a strictly philosophi-
cal standpoint, we cannot justify many of those beliefs. As Radnitzky 
points out, synthetic statements are fallible, so that any attempt to 
justify those beliefs leads to the trilemma. Yet in ethics, we take those 
beliefs for granted. If we reject them, ethics does not make sense in the 
fi rst place. Therefore, raising skepticism about them is inappropriate 
in ethics.
Anyway, except for moral beliefs based on some immediate experi-
ence, those basic beliefs themselves have no moral implications. They 
are just a tool. They can be used for planning, doing, or justifying not 
only moral actions but immoral actions and amoral actions. Therefore, 
it is impossible to draw morality from those beliefs alone.
There is no self-evident rational ground for morality. Some might 
think that a belief like “killing humans is morally wrong” can be such 
a ground. But it is doubtful that this belief is a self-evident rational 
ground for morality. There are cases where killing humans is consid-
ered acceptable, as in self-defense. Therefore, rationalists can demand a 
rational ground for this belief, which eventually leads to the trilemma. 
Nobody can provide a self-evident rational ground for morality because 
whatever ground he provides, rationalists can reasonably challenge it 
without committing a performative self-contradiction. Those who ob-
ject to this need to provide a self-evident rational ground for morality.
On knowledge, Roderick Chisholm points out the problem of the cri-
terion. He distinguishes between the following two questions: A) “What 
do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?” B) “How are we to 
decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge?”31 He 
writes,
if you don’t know the answer to the fi rst of these pairs of questions—if you 
don’t know what things you know or how far your knowledge extends—it is 
diffi cult to see how you could possibly fi gure out an answer to the second.
On the other hand,…if you don’t know the answer to the second of these 
pairs of questions—if you don’t know how to go about deciding whether or 
not you know, if you don’t know what the criteria of knowing are—it is dif-
fi cult to see how you could possibly fi gure out an answer to the fi rst.32
Skeptics will say: “You cannot answer question A until you have an-
swered question B. And you cannot answer question B until you have 
answered question A. Therefore you cannot answer either question.” 
Apart from skepticism, Chisholm points out two other responses to 
the problem: methodism and particularism. Methodists are “those who 
think they have an answer to B, and who then, in terms of it, work out 
their answer to A.” He identifi es empiricism as a form of methodism. 
31 Roderick M. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1982), 65.
32 Ibid., 65–66.
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Particularists are “those who have it the other way around.”33 Chish-
olm claims that the methodist criterion “is very broad and far-reaching 
and at the same time completely arbitrary.”34 On the other hand, we 
do know many things that originate from the senses and memory. For 
these and other reasons, Chisholm thinks that, among the three re-
sponses, particularism is the most reasonable.
In any case, Chisholm’s problem of the criterion shows that we can-
not rationally justify morality. Methodism and particularism do not 
work either. Since there is no rational ground for morality, we cannot 
adopt particularism in the fi rst place. This suggests that we cannot 
know the criterion of a rational ground for morality. Some might think 
that we can draw the criterion from the criteria of rational grounds for 
knowledge in general. But even if we can, there is no rational ground 
for morality which passes the criterion. Therefore, rational justifi cation 
of morality is impossible. Those who object to this need to provide a 
rational ground for morality.
4. Coherentism
According to Peter Klein, there are two forms of coherentism: a trans-
ference form and an emergent form. “The transference form…pictures 
justifi cation as being a property of one proposition that can be trans-
ferred to another and then to another, etc., and eventually back again.” 
The emergent form “views justifi cation as an emergent property such 
that when sets of propositions have a certain arrangement—a coher-
ent structure—all members of the set of propositions are justifi ed. Sets 
of propositions are the primary bearers of justifi cation and individual 
propositions are justifi ed only in virtue of being a member of the set.”35 
The transference form is not an epistemically responsible position be-
cause it is viciously circular. The emergent form cannot be an ultimate 
justifi cation, especially when a set of beliefs is incomplete or includes 
an error. Although coherentists would think it unlikely, a set of beliefs 
can include false beliefs and still be consistent.
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord presents a coherence theory of justifi cation. 
According to it, “a belief is justifi ed if, and then to the extent that, 
it coheres well with the other things a person believes.”36 Sayre-Mc-
33 Ibid., 66.
34 Ibid., 67.
35 Peter Klein, “Human knowledge and the infi nite progress of reasoning,” 
Philosophical Studies 134, no. 1 (2007): 8. Klein owes the distinction to Laurence 
BonJour. See Laurence BonJour, “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 1 (1978): 3; Laurence BonJour, The 
Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985), 24–25.
36 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, “Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory,” 
in Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong and Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 177.
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Cord distinguishes between permissive and positive justifi cation. He 
says, “a belief is (i) permissively justifi ed if and only if the weight of 
the evidence available to the person does not, on balance, tell against 
the belief; and (ii) positively justifi ed if and only if the weight of the 
evidence, again on balance, tells in favor of the belief (just how posi-
tively justifi ed it is will be a matter of how strong the evidence, on bal-
ance, is).” Sayre-McCord also identifi es three components of coherence: 
“evidential consistency, connectedness, and comprehensiveness.” In his 
view, “a set of beliefs counts as (minimally) coherent if and only if the 
set is evidentially consistent—that is, if and only if the weight of the 
evidence provided by the various beliefs in the set don’t tell, on bal-
ance, against any of the others.” Thus, evidential consistency (minimal 
coherence) rests on permissive justifi cation. And “connectedness and 
comprehensiveness, serve…to increase the relative coherence of a set 
that is minimally coherent.”37
Sayre-McCord’s coherentism is different from most versions of co-
herentism. First, it “acknowledges that certain beliefs may serve as 
suitable regress-stoppers. Unlike foundationalism, however, it insists 
that these regress-stoppers—the beliefs that count as permissively, but 
not positively, justifi ed—enjoy no special epistemic privilege and are 
themselves characterizable only in terms of the evidential connections 
they bear to other beliefs.” Second, “it treats coherence itself not as a 
justifying property of those beliefs but rather as a measure of the evi-
dential support the beliefs enjoy. In every case, what evidence a person 
has for her beliefs is found not in their relative coherence, but in the 
contents of her other beliefs.”38 As Sayre-McCord admits, these suggest 
that his coherentism embraces relativism about justifi cation. There-
fore, it cannot be an ultimate rational justifi cation of morality.
Sayre-McCord recognizes three objections to coherentism. The fi rst 
one is that “coherentism has got to be false because the mere fact that a 
set of beliefs is coherent is no reason to think they are true.” He replies 
to this objection as follows: “a belief is justifi ed if and then to the extent 
that it coheres well with a person’s other beliefs, but it is not justifi ed 
by the fact that it is a member of a coherent set of beliefs.”39 According 
to Sayre-McCord, a person’s other beliefs are not members of a coher-
ent set of beliefs. But there is no need to think in this way. It is possible 
to assume a type of coherentism in which a person’s other beliefs are 
members of a coherent set of beliefs. According to this coherentism, 
a belief is justifi ed if it is a member of a coherent set of beliefs which 
includes a person’s other beliefs. Anyway, irrespective of whether a co-
herent set of beliefs include a person’s other beliefs, the following holds: 
even if a belief coheres with a person’s other beliefs, it does not follow 
that the belief is justifi ed. This is because the person’s other beliefs 
37 Ibid., 166.
38 Ibid., 177.
39 Ibid., 170.
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may be false. If those beliefs are false, coherence with them does not 
justify the belief. Even if those beliefs are true, mere coherence with 
them does not necessarily justify the belief. A belief may cohere with 
other true beliefs from all conceivable perspectives. But there may be 
an unknown perspective from which the belief does not cohere with 
them.
The second objection to coherentism is that “coherentism is ob-
jectionably conservative and inappropriately privileges one’s actual 
beliefs.”40 Sayre-McCord replies to this objection as follows: although a 
coherentist relies on what he happens to believe, “those beliefs them-
selves, especially in light of the new evidence experience and refl ec-
tion regularly provide, won’t stand as fi xed points but will instead shift 
in response to the new evidence (if they are to continue to count as 
justifi ed).”41 Sayre-McCord claims this because he recognizes human 
fallibility. But this suggests that coherence alone does not provide an 
ultimate justifi cation.
The third objection to coherentism is that “coherentism fails to rec-
ognize suffi ciently the importance of experience.”42 In responding to 
this objection, Sayre-McCord fi rst points out “the role cognitively spon-
taneous beliefs are able to play within coherentism.” Those beliefs sug-
gest that some experiences have “a cognitive content (in which case it 
is the content of the experience that serves as evidence),” or that some 
experiences are “the content of an appropriate cognitive attitude (in 
which case it is the fact that such an experience occurred that serves as 
evidence).”43 Second, he claims that “the status of our beliefs as justi-
fi ed depends on their being properly responsive to experience and not 
on their being coherent.”44 Yet if we allow empiricism to enter moral 
coherentism, it follows that morality is not justifi ed by reason alone.
In coherentism, we should question the scope of a coherent set of 
beliefs. Does the set include only physical (including psychological) be-
liefs? Or does it include metaphysical beliefs too? If the set includes 
only physical beliefs, it may not be enough for justifying a moral belief, 
because metaphysics may be a crucial basis for morality. If the set in-
cludes both physical and metaphysical beliefs, it may be able to justify 
a moral belief. Yet in this case, the justifi cation is not completely ra-
tional because we cannot draw metaphysical beliefs from reason alone. 
Either way coherentism cannot be an ultimate rational justifi cation of 
morality.
As we have seen, coherentism has at least one of the following prob-
lems: First, coherentism is viciously circular. Second, a coherent set 
of beliefs can be incomplete or include an error. Third, coherentism 
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 173.
42 Ibid., 170.
43 Ibid., 173–74.
44 Ibid., 174.
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embraces relativism about justifi cation. Fourth, even if a belief coheres 
with a person’s other beliefs, it does not follow that the belief is justi-
fi ed. Fifth, a coherent set of beliefs may not be enough for justifying 
a moral belief. Sixth, a coherent set of beliefs may not be completely 
rational. Therefore, coherentism cannot be an ultimate rational justi-
fi cation of morality.
5. Contextualism
Mark Timmons distinguishes between three types of contextualism. 
The fi rst type is circumstantial contextualism, which is as follows: 
“Whether one has knowledge of, or indeed justifi edly believes, some 
proposition is partly dependent on certain facts about oneself and cer-
tain facts about one’s environment.”45 The second type is normative 
contextualism, which is as follows: “A person S is justifi ed at time t in 
believing some proposition p in context C just in case S’s holding p at t 
conforms to the relevant set of epistemic practices and norms operative 
in C.” We should not confuse circumstantial contextualism with norma-
tive one. Circumstantial contextualism is analogous to circumstantial 
(situational, environmental) relativism in ethics, which holds that “the 
rightness and wrongness of particular actions, practices and so forth 
depend in part on facts about the agent’s circumstances.” By contrast, 
normative contextualism is analogous to ethical relativism, which holds 
that “the moral standards of a group (together with relevant factual in-
formation) determine which particular moral statements are true for 
members of that group.”46 The third type is structural contextualism, 
which is as follows: “Regresses of justifi cation may legitimately termi-
nate with beliefs, which, in the context in question, are not in need of 
justifi cation. Call these latter beliefs, contextually basic beliefs.”47
Timmons adopts structural contextualism. His contextualism has 
the following four central claims:
C1: There are a number of irreducible moral generalizations that are de-
feasible and that we acquire as a result of moral education.…
C2: However, they are contextually basic: they do not represent self-evi-
dent moral truths knowable a priori nor do they result from the deliv-
erance of some faculty of moral intuition.…
C3: The contextually basic beliefs provide (along with relevant nonmoral 
factual beliefs) the justifi catory basis for justifi ed belief in other, non-
basic moral propositions.…
C4: …In many cases, two or more morally relevant considerations ex-
pressed by the basic moral generalizations will be present in a single 
case, and for these cases we need have no algorithm or ordering system 
45 Mark Timmons, “Outline of a Contextualist Moral Epistemology,” in Moral 
Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 
and Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 294.
46 Ibid., 296.
47 Ibid., 297.
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to which we can appeal to adjudicate the confl ict. In these cases, moral 
judgment takes over.48
C2 is where structural contextualism differs from foundationalism. 
The former features the following two claims: “(1) In ordinary contexts 
of doxastic justifi cation, epistemically basic beliefs are not in need of 
justifi cation. (2) Beliefs that are basic in one context may, in a different 
context, require justifi cation.”49 On C4, judgment means “the ability to 
evaluate a situation, assess evidence, and come to a reasonable deci-
sion without following rules.”50
Charles Larmore also defends a contextualist view of justifi cation. 
In his view, “not our beliefs but rather changes in them are the proper 
object of justifi cation. In deciding whether to adopt a new belief, there-
fore, we are to ask not whether the belief set comprising our existing 
beliefs plus the new one is justifi ed by its coherence, but instead wheth-
er adding the new belief is justifi ed by what we already believe.”51 Lar-
more says, “We can reason only in a context of given belief, which as 
such does not call for justifi cation, but on the contrary gives us the 
means for considering possible changes of belief, a context that is ours 
in virtue of our place in history.”52
We cannot doubt everything at once. Ludwig Wittgenstein says as 
follows: “If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as 
doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty” 
(OC 115).53 “One doubts on specifi c grounds” (OC 458). Karl Popper 
says as follows: “though every one of our assumptions may be chal-
lenged, it is quite impracticable to challenge all of them at the same 
time. Thus all criticism must be piecemeal.”54 “While discussing a 
problem we always accept (if only temporarily) all kinds of things as 
unproblematic.”55 Although we cannot doubt everything at once, it is 
possible to doubt every moral belief at once. This is because doubting 
itself can be independent of morality.
Contextualism cannot be an ultimate rational justifi cation of moral-
ity. First, since moral beliefs not in need of justifi cation in one context 
48 Ibid., 309.
49 Ibid., 311.
50 Harold I. Brown, Rationality (London: Routledge, 1988), 137. Timmons 
particularly defends ethical contextualism. For a defense of contextualism in general, 
see, for example, Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, 
and Context, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
51 Charles E. Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 62.
52 Ibid., 115.
53 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von 
Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1975). 
The “115” refers to paragraph 115.
54 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientifi c Knowledge 
(London: Routledge, 2002), 322.
55 Ibid., 323.
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may need justifi cation in a different context, contextualism is not an ul-
timate justifi cation of morality. The fact that some moral beliefs are not 
in need of justifi cation in one context does not mean that those beliefs 
are justifi ed. As we saw, there is no self-evident rational ground for 
morality. Rationalists can reasonably challenge any moral belief with-
out committing a performative self-contradiction. Second, Timmons’s 
contextualism often needs moral judgment to reach a moral conclusion. 
But there is no guarantee that moral judgment enables us to identify 
appropriate morals. Even if it does, moral judgment is, by defi nition, 
rationally unjustifi able according to Agrippa’s trilemma. Therefore, his 
contextualism cannot be an ultimate rational justifi cation of morality. 
Third, we can challenge contextualism itself. Eventually one cannot 
rationally justify it because the justifi cation leads to the trilemma.
6. Infi nitism
Klein defends infi nitism, which is as follows:
Infi nitism is committed to an account of propositional justifi cation such that 
a proposition, p, is justifi ed for S iff there is an endless series of non-repeat-
ing propositions available to S such that beginning with p, each succeeding 
member is a reason for the immediately preceding one. It is committed to 
an account of doxastic justifi cation such that a belief is doxastically justifi ed 
for S iff S has engaged in tracing the reasons in virtue of which the proposi-
tion p is justifi ed far forward enough to satisfy the contextually determined 
requirements.56
Infi nitism is not valid at least for rational justifi cation of morality, 
although it might be valid elsewhere. As we saw, there is no self-evi-
dent rational ground for morality in the fi rst place. An endless series of 
invalid grounds does not rationally justify a moral proposition.
7. German Idealism
German idealists have different ways of escaping Agrippa’s trilemma. 
According to Paul Franks, Kant holds that “an escape from the Agrip-
pan trilemma is possible only if all series of grounds terminate in an 
absolute ground, and God is that absolute ground.”57
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi also tries to escape the trilemma. He 
thinks that all standard philosophical responses to it are problematic 
since “[e]very appeal to some new kind of intrinsic justifi cation suc-
ceeds only in raising the demand for justifi cation about something else 
that was hitherto taken for granted.” Franks writes,
The only genuine escape from Agrippan skepticism, according to Jacobi, 
would be to reject the initial demand for justifi cation or, better yet, to stop 
56 Klein, “Human knowledge and the infi nite progress of reasoning,” 11.
57 Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, 
and Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2005), 114.
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raising it in the fi rst place. To make our escape, we need to see that adequate 
justifi cation is not mediation by some absolute or unconditioned ground, as 
the philosophical tradition would have it, but the immediacy of ordinary life 
and perception. Ordinary things and persons just are—immediately—ex-
cept for their dependence on God, which is known with as much immediacy 
as the existence of ourselves and others. Reason is not a faculty of inference 
but a faculty of perception.58
According to Franks, other German idealists “are all committed, in 
various ways, to the view that genuine justifi cation can be achieved 
only within a system that meets two conditions: the holistic condition 
that every particular (object, fact, or judgment) be determined through 
its role within the whole and not through any intrinsic properties; and 
the monistic condition that the whole be grounded in an absolute prin-
ciple that is immanent and not transcendent.”59 Those German ideal-
ists develop a version of Spinozism which escapes Agrippa’s trilemma. 
They differ from Kant since Kant does not aim at “achieving a Spinoz-
ist system that meets the holistic and monistic requirements.”60
Although German idealists may escape Agrippa’s trilemma, their 
solutions cannot be an ultimate rational justifi cation of morality. First, 
in Kant’s view, the absolute ground is God, which we cannot under-
stand by reason alone. Second, Jacobi defi nes reason not as “a faculty of 
inference” but as “a faculty of perception.”61 Let us accept this defi nition 
of reason. From the fact that some perceptions are incorrect as in illu-
sion, it follows that reason is sometimes incorrect. Therefore, reason is 
not enough to identify appropriate morals. Some might think that rea-
son is a faculty of correct perception. Then we need to distinguish cor-
rect perceptions from incorrect ones. We cannot appeal to reason (cor-
rect perception) alone to distinguish between them, because otherwise 
correct perception alone identifi es correct perceptions, which is circu-
lar. Therefore, we must appeal to something other than reason (cor-
rect perception) to distinguish between them. This means that reason 
alone cannot identify appropriate morals. Third, we should question 
the scope of the Spinozist system developed by other German idealists. 
Does the system include only physical (including psychological) beliefs? 
Or does it include metaphysical beliefs too? If the system includes only 
physical beliefs, it may not be enough for justifying morality, because 
metaphysics may be a crucial basis for morality. If the system includes 
both physical and metaphysical beliefs, it may be able to justify moral-
ity. Yet in this case, the justifi cation is not completely rational, because 
we cannot draw metaphysical beliefs from reason alone. Thus, even 
if German idealists escape the trilemma, their solutions cannot be an 
ultimate rational justifi cation of morality.
58 Ibid., 164.
59 Ibid., 9–10.
60 Ibid., 10.
61 Ibid., 164.
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8. Conclusion
We have seen various responses to Agrippa’s trilemma, such as foun-
dationalism, coherentism, contextualism, infi nitism, and German ide-
alism. While they may provide some justifi cation of morality, they fail 
to provide an ultimate rational justifi cation of morality. Therefore, the 
trilemma applies at least to rational justifi cation of contentful moral 
beliefs. I say “contentful” moral beliefs because rational justifi cation of 
empty moral beliefs (such as the belief “it is always moral to act mor-
ally”) is easy. Agrippa’s trilemma does not apply to rational justifi ca-
tion of empty moral beliefs. I also say “rational” justifi cation because 
there are non-rational justifi cations of morality, such as attempts to 
ground morality on a moral sense, moral sentiments, or the divine.62 
Since they are non-rational justifi cations, they do not need a rational 
ground. Although it is possible to apply the trilemma to those non-
rational grounds, it only shows that one cannot rationally justify them. 
This is irrelevant to the non-rational justifi cations because they do not 
seek rational justifi cation in the fi rst place.
What does Agrippa’s trilemma mean for rationalist ethics? Most of 
them rest on at least one of the following assumptions:
(a) Reason alone can grasp X. Here X can be (1) moral Forms, (2) 
virtue, (3) the natural, and so on.63
(b) X is good. Here X can be (1) human fl ourishing, (2) happiness, 
(3) pleasure, (4) self-preservation, (5) security, (6) freedom, (7) 
equality, and so on.64
(c) We ought to X. Here X can be (1) base morality on practical 
reason alone, (2) maximize utility, (3) assert individuality, (4) 
exclude metaphysics from ethics, (5) achieve political neutral-
ity, and so on.65
I do not claim that those assumptions are not morally right. Some as-
sumptions may be morally right. Yet since the trilemma applies to all 
those assumptions, they are rationally unjustifi able. This means that 
62 Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and 
Adam Smith, I show that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories 
alone cannot identify appropriate morals. See Noriaki Iwasa, “Sentimentalism and 
Metaphysical Beliefs,” Prolegomena 9, no. 2 (2010); Noriaki Iwasa, “Sentimentalism 
and the Is-Ought Problem,” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11, no. 33 (2011); 
Noriaki Iwasa, “On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism,” Prolegomena 12, no. 1 
(2013). Regarding the divine, I develop standards for grading religions including 
various forms of spiritualism. See Noriaki Iwasa, “Grading Religions,” Sophia 50, 
no. 1 (2011).
63 These are assumptions in, for example, Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethics.
64 These are assumptions in, for example, Aristotle’s ethics, utilitarianism, 
Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, and John Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice.
65 These are assumptions in, for example, Kant’s ethics, utilitarianism, Mill’s On 
Liberty, and Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism.
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rationalist ethics based on any one of them are rationally unjustifi able.
Some rationalist ethics try to provide only form, not content, to 
avoid dogmatic assumptions, although their success in this point is 
questionable. Kant’s ethics and Habermas’s and Apel’s discourse ethics 
are typical such attempts. I discuss them elsewhere.66
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